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INTRODUCTION
Angola is experiencing an existential transition that will change the way power in the
country is reconfigured and projected. The pragmatism and survivalist instinct that
have defined its internal and foreign policies will be sorely tested under the reins of
the new President, a financial crisis and regional turmoil. After almost four decades
of rule under President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the country inaugurated a new
president in September 2017. This is an existential moment given the usurpation and
on-going manipulation of power that the Dos Santos family and elite clan have
sustained. During the 1975-2002 war, the ruling People’s Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) developed and implemented Dos Santos’ narrow vision for
Angola with defence priorities and development of the oil sector at the forefront. In
the war’s immediate aftermath, the president built on his credentials as a peace-
maker but failed to produce a peace dividend, pushing instead for mass development
projects to aid the elite’s extractive interests. During the oil boom years and devel-
opment bonanza (2004-2012), Dos Santos further eroded the checks and balances of
several organs of the state and personalised his control of the security apparatus and
the economy. Since the 2014 oil crisis, efforts have veered towards securing regime
survival at all costs, exposing many fragilities of the post-conflict state. The contra-
dictions of the state project are increasingly exposed as the ruling party and its elite
attempt once more to push for difficult changes in an exclusionary and opaque
manner. The impact of a mismanaged transition would reverberate beyond Angola’s
borders.
Relations with key allies have formed a cornerstone of the regime’s survival strategy.
President Dos Santos has been the main architect of Angola’s foreign policy and is
expected, if his health permits, to continue holding this portfolio even after the
former Defence Minister Joao Lourenco took over the presidency. Dos Santos retains
the chairmanship of the ruling MPLA party, which will create two potentially incom-
patible power poles. Luanda’s policy has centered on balancing conflicting and
contradictory relations by setting aside ideological alignments for profitable and
strategic calculations. This has led Angola to engage Russia, Israel, the United States,
Portugal, numerous Arab states, Brazil, China and North Korea with differing trans-
actional objectives. Its interventions in Africa have been aimed at deepening these
alliances but also creating an adequate financial and diplomatic buffer to assert its
own version of African solutions to African problems.
This Egmont Paper focuses on Angola’s foreign policy in the African continent by
assessing how its interventions are fuelled by different underlying interests in elite
and regime survival. It argues that Luanda’s policy towards the continent has demon-
strated the continued objective of pairing privileged political access and clientelism
with financial and elite interest, while starting to ground these in broader, more2
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approaches that have not always created permanence and wide-ranging leverage
with key African capitals. Instead, Angola’s policies may be surpassed by shifting
dynamics as the continent faces new threats just as Angola struggles to ensure polit-
ical continuity with its financial power heavily compromised. The very tools used to
support its foreign policy to date (the strategy of President Dos Santos and the power
of petro-dollars) are experiencing serious challenges and changes. This policy brief
focuses on political and security calculations and briefly identifies the financial
aspects that underlie Angola’s foreign policy interactions. Multilateralism is balanced
by bilateral imperatives that attempt but do not always succeed in positioning
Angola as a powerbroker and kingmaker. It also briefly outlines the different forms
taken by that strategy of creating dependence with key allies. The brief is divided into
four sections that trace its operating principles, its approach to multilateral organisa-
tions, important failed policies and pivotal bilateral engagements with key client
states and partners.3
OPERATING PRINCIPLES: PERMANENT INTERESTS AND 
SHIFTING LEVERS
The experience of decades of proxy and direct involvement of forces and interests
from Washington, Moscow, Pretoria, Havana, key African countries, Portugal and the
UN during Angola’s 1975-2002 civil war continue to influence Luanda’s realpolitik
approach to the world and in particular towards Africa. The country learned from
Russia (in the post Cold War era) the virtue of remaining engaged even after a loss of
power: essential in playing for long-term gains and building capacity to exert
dominance and influence. The regime learned from the United States that perma-
nent friends may not be as important as permanent interests, and that ideological
rigidity will nullify important financial opportunities. It learned from Pretoria (under
Apartheid) that being on the wrong side of history is a fatal mistake, and that libera-
tion alliances (between the MPLA and the African National Congress or ANC) may not
be a guarantee of unwavering support. It learned from Portugal that a small voice will
remain small even when historical ties and spheres of influence are great. Finally, it
learned from the UN that multilateral organisations can play key roles in ending
conflicts – either intentionally or by default – and that sanctions, isolation, and diplo-
matic pressure can be effective as long as there is unity of purpose.
As a result, Luanda’s foreign policy is built on two guiding principles that are direct
remnants of its internationalised civil war: to play a role in the international arena
and deflect any external interference. ‘The presupposition remains that only those
who are strong have a voice in the international community,’ is an objective Luanda
takes very seriously. Angola wants to assert its strength on the continent to project
power internationally as it understands that only with powerful alliances can it buffer
itself from intrusive financial and political interventions. By working within the global
system of governance Angola will have more options. ‘We believe that as a country
we are only safe if we are with the international community at large.’1 It also under-
stands that expanding its power beyond the continent into Portugal and Brazil (as
part of an expansionist strategy to financially secure political influence), while
remaining Russia and China’s most important partner in Africa (under different
imperatives) will give it the necessary international projection it expects. This is
reflective of Angola’s desire to been seen as more than just an African country.
By balancing different partners, Angola aims to avoid serving just ‘one master’ and
has managed to protect itself from external interference in domestic political issues
and intrusive financial arrangements. Relationships are defined by Angola’s stand-
ards, allowing it to retain the levers of control. It does not easily succumb to external
pressures, given that it is not a major recipient of foreign aid and has the diplomatic
1 Angolan Foreign Minister George Chikoty’s speech to Chatham House, 20 February 2012.4
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYclout of its mineral wealth. However, Luanda also understands that taking an isola-
tionist and overtly independent stance will give it less diplomatic cover. Angola may
be moving towards seeking greater cover from key allies as its economy weakens, its
oil production slows, and it faces multiple internal political fronts.
In Africa, Angola wants to develop a network of client states in the same manner it
has woven together tactical and strategic alliances nationally based on economic
imperatives in exchange for loyalty. This is an expansionist agenda that was initially
aimed at isolating the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
during the war and has evolved into leveraging influence in key capitals with the aim
of later recalling their debt. By intervening to provide support to key African capitals,
Luanda is attempting to create predictability and permanence of power. The Angolan
government is also positioning itself strategically to be ‘courted’ by different interna-
tional players to assert its influence; this confidence derives from its sense of excep-
tionalism.2 Multilateralism enters Angola’s strategic calculations when such fora can
naturally press for defined interests. Luanda continues to believe that their ability to
make decisive interventions multilaterally is limited.3
While Luanda does not push for a wide net of client relations with key states, it does
identify specific countries for their comparative advantages. They fall under the
principle of convergence of purpose: each serves different purposes and spans
different regions. In Southern Africa, Luanda’s security and financial relations with
Mozambique and Zimbabwe are based on historical and ideological alliances as both
countries are facing political turmoil. Angola has allegedly sent ‘advisors’ and police
contingents to support the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) and Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
or FRELIMO) in stabilising their own political crises. In central Africa, Angolan
relations with the two Congos are based on security concerns and national stability,
driven by the need to control the leadership in both. Engagements with the Central
African Republic (CAR) and Burundi are based on securing multilateral and more
specific leverage with the UN and the African Union (AU). Luanda’s interests in these
countries are aimed at securing longer-term access and influence with key interna-
tional actors and multilateral forums, while entrenching its proxy political interests.
Angola views Burundi from the historical perspective of the 1998 Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) war and its antagonistic relationship with Rwanda; it is also
using the Burundi and DRC crisis as a way of asserting its leadership within the Inter-
national Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), while ensuring that it plays a
role in defining the political landscape of its central African region. Luanda’s interests
in the CAR are tied to 1) its fear of the expansion of militant Islam into the region, 2)
its mediating and stabilisation role vis-à-vis the UN and the AU, and 3) the underre-
2 Luanda believes that its political trajectory and post-conflict reconstruction makes it exceptional among
other African states.
3 Correspondence with senior Angolan security officer, 2016.5
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYported financial interests in the diamond sector. Angola’s interest in several west
African countries, also under the strategy of president-to-president and clientelistic
relations, relates to its financial expansionist project, discussed further in this brief.
The surprising client relationship established with President Jacob Zuma since 2006
has a wider continental objective given South Africa’s credibility on many multilateral
fronts. President Zuma allegedly received financial aid (estimated to be US$4 million,
although the exact amount is unknown) from Angola to fight his legal battles against
corruption charges resulting from the 2007 arms deal, and later in support of his bid
for the presidency in 2008. A leaked intelligence report, the Browse Mole report,
showed how the Angolan establishment planned to covertly support Zuma to further
his presidential aspirations and edge out Thabo Mbeki, whose relations with Dos
Santos were strained. Zuma has ‘repaid’ this support by providing Angola with a
partnership that would give it greater influence but also includes more nuanced
benefits such as the trilateral engagement with the DRC. In 2011, South Africa and
the DRC signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Grand Inga project and
Pretoria is credited with having inserted Angola into the preamble, paving the way
for Luanda’s secured economic engagement and a transmission line that would pass
through Angola,4 making it a major off-taker of energy.
Africa is also a platform for reaching international markets, diplomatic relations, and
asserting a position of dominance. If Luanda can anchor its influence in key regions on
the continent it can then use this dominance to project its interests globally, as demon-
strated by its emerging partnerships with Portuguese and Chinese private and public
investors. While it defines its rise as an African power, Luanda has far greater ambitions
as demonstrated by its investments in Portugal, Brazil and elsewhere, and its previous
partnership with the China International Fund (CIF). Angola’s leap into the world
economy began through its rapid expanse into Africa; it prioritised the economic
aspect given its financial strength as an oil producer, but also the simplistic diplomacy
of financial arrangements. Securing the same level of political and diplomatic influence
would have required more time and far more complex lobbies. In this way, economic
muscle can achieve direct political and diplomatic leverage with key African partners.
Elite enrichment, through operations under the national oil company Sonangol and
other instruments, is a key policy objective but falls outside the remit of this brief.
As a result of all these operating principles, Angola has no defined and ideologically
driven foreign policy that exports coherent principles and objectives. Its pragmatism
and realism leads it to craft tailored approaches. Yet several imperatives can be
identified:
1. regime survival and the enrichment of the ruling elite;
2. continued influence with key trading partners China, Portugal and Brazil;
4 Interview Grand Inga financing institution, Johannesburg, 2016.6
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and Russia as its most dominant military partner;
4. immunity from external liberal pressures because of its petro-power and self-
defined state-building project;
5. dominance in Africa and hegemonic influence in Central Africa, while securing
key allies in different regions;
6. positioning itself as a model for an internal, albeit illiberal, model of peace-
building for other African states to contrast with Western approaches;
7. instrumentalising its role in multilateral forums to pursue narrow bilateral inter-
ests yet failing to have a structured approach to the UN, ICGLR, the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) and the AU, making it an unpredictable partner, and
8. as an internal tool of stateness – by exposing nationally the successes it has
abroad the government feeds the propaganda cycle of the ‘Angola rising’ narra-
tive.
These imperatives expose the fragile basis upon which Angola’s ‘rising’ power will
gradually decline. Not all relationships can be based on monetary profit and elite
survival, requiring more nuanced engagement instead. Contradictions will continue
to emerge as Luanda projects power externally, while it postpones important
reforms in an attempt to secure the necessary transformative elements nationally to
strengthen its leadership, economy and security.7
BILATERAL MISCALCULATIONS IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND 
COTE D’IVOIRE
Angola’s foray into West Africa has previously been marred by miscalculations that
have exposed its foreign policy contradictions. Its confidence led it to plough through
regional interests and competing policies of countries that were undergoing political
changes. Unable or unwilling to recognise these shifts, Angola was left isolated
during its engagements in the Ivory Coast in 2010 and Guinea-Bissau in 2011. This led
to the reformulation of the bilateral imperatives which may impact how it proceeds
in supporting incumbents like President Joseph Kabila in the DRC who have become
a political liability, and how it positions itself in countries that have on-going multi-
lateral and regional stabilisation and political initiatives.
Angola’s Security Sector Reform mission to Guinea-Bissau (Missão de Cooperação
Técnico-Militar à Guiné-Bissau or MISSANG)5 in 2010 was an important first step in
Luanda’s exposure in a region that it did not dominate. It was aimed at protecting
economic interests but also had geostrategic objectives. Angola’s primary interest
was to stabilise Guinea-Bissau in order to advance economic development priorities,
in particular the Port of Buba project in which Angola had invested in 2011. The
objective of entering Bissau was also tied to Angola’s role and aspirations in the Gulf
of Guinea Commission (GGC). The GGC, a regional bloc comprising of the DRC,
Nigeria, ROC, Gabon, Cameroon, São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola and Equatorial Guinea,
provides a strategic bridge between the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and ECCAS on oil policy coordination. Angola hosts the GGC in Luanda and
aims to take a leading role by cementing its economic position in the region.
MISSANG was the first time Angola took on the responsibility to facilitate a security
sector reform (SSR) exercise with the mandate to institute wide-ranging reforms that
would have a political impact. Luanda committed over US$100 million to the reform
of the Guinean armed forces.6 Its assistance to Bissau had, however, started earlier
in 2007 when the two capitals began discussing areas for economic cooperation. In
2010, the two countries signed a contract for the construction of the Buba port,
which would cost US$500-700 million.7 The port, which has the potential of creating
an economic hub in the region, is of great economic and strategic interest for the
investors who build and manage it. The port would be linked to Angola’s other finan-
5 The objective was to reduce the army to a mere 3,000 troops, while demobilising the remaining forces and
guaranteeing their reintegration with a pension fund worth $45 million (contributed by Angola, Brazil and
Portugal).
6 Angolan Foreign Minister George Chikoty’s speech to Chatham House, 20 February 2012; it is unclear if this
money was made available to Bissau as a repayable loan or if it was delivered as aid.
7 This would allow the port to cater for 60,000 ton ships during its first five years in operation and, at a later
stage, ships of up to 240,000 tons. The project also included the construction of a railway to support trade
from the port as it passed through Guinea Conakry to Mali.8
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linking Boe to Buba.
After the 2011 coup in Bissau, Luanda was placed in a very politically sensitive
position. A full ground force invasion was considered to protect the constitutionally
elected president; Luanda had 2,500 troops ready to deploy. However, Angola
decided to withdraw the mission. A full military engagement would have faced logis-
tical and operational issues given that Angola would have had difficulty maintaining
the deployment without a regional landing base, although it could have potentially
used Guine Conakry for operational support. Diplomats suggest that it was SADC that
advised the president against this action because of reputational costs and
worsening relations with ECOWAS and Nigeria. The withdrawal embarrassed Luanda.
Angola now realises that it misread the region and Nigeria’s reluctance to allow
another African power to operate in its sphere of influence. As a result, Luanda began
to rethink its bilateral military deployments, opting instead to engage on a basis that
has greater multilateral support. Relations with Nigeria have started to improve but
as Luanda begins to show renewed interests in Bissau this will be tested.
Despite this failed mission, Angola has continued to engage Bissau economically. In
2015, Angola reopened the Embassy in Bissau, which is currently run by an external
intelligence officer. Angola’s largest mobile phone company, UNITEL – which is
owned by Isabel Dos Santos – was bidding to go back into Bissau as the third telecom
service provider. Bauxite Angola (BA) announced in late 2014 that it was planning to
invest US$500 million to relaunch its mining interests in Madina Boe.8 BA was
expecting to exploit the mineral resources, commercialise them and also prospect
for other subsoil minerals. However, the oil crisis has dampened these ambitions,
and Angola may seek other partners, particularly the Chinese, to fund these projects.
Reports are emerging that ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau’s (ECOMIB) financial
difficulties could be rescued with Angolan funds, while the need to draw more troops
from outside Nigeria could also create an entry point for Luanda. More importantly,
as the internal dynamics within Bissau’s ruling African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde
or PAIGC) worsen, Luanda is being courted by the PAIGC leader to mediate the crisis.
To date, Luanda continues to support Guinea-Bissau via its role in the Community of
Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa or
CPLP) and the AU but could in future move towards a greater bilateral role.
The political fallout that ensued when President Dos Santos stood behind Ivorian
President Laurent Gbagbo after he had lost the 2010 election to Alassane Outtarra
provided another important lesson. Luanda’s first reaction was to send a military
contingent of 300 men to protect Gbagbo in addition to shipments of arms in a policy
8 ‘Bauxite Angola plans to resume mining in Guinea-Bissau’, 4 September 2014, MacauHub.9
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community declared their support for Ouatarra, Dos Santos began to reconsider his
diplomatic position. A task force was created within the presidency and the Foreign
Ministry in Luanda to deal with the Ivorian situation, although Gbagbo was captured
before any real reversal of policy could occur. This cost Luanda its privileged relation-
ship with Abidjan and the economic interests that came with this relationship as
Ouatarra took the presidency. Before his downfall, Gbagbo had signed a deal with
Sonangol worth US$100 million to increase the Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage’s (SIR)
capacity. Sonangol, which has retained a 20% stake in SIR since 2000, was expected
to continue expanding its interests in the country. However, the shadow cast by the
Trafigure/Puma Energy (co-owned by Angolan oil company Sonangol) petrochemical
waste dumping scandal and trial may also temper future investments.
Angola drew several lessons from this experience. Regardless of strong presidential
ties, when a leader’s political utility has expired and lost favour with the international
and African communities, Angola will avoid being associated with a losing side. Since
then, Luanda has tried through different means to improve relations with Abidjan
although Dos Santos strongly disapproves of Ouattarra, who sent Gbagbo to be tried
at the International Criminal Court. This experience also taught Luanda to ensure
that economic interests are safeguarded by more than just presidential guarantees
and niceties. This case in particular will resonate with current and future challenges
Angola now faces with the two Congos. With regards to the experience in Guinea-
Bissau, Angola has rethought its approach to multilateralism as the avenue to
contain embarrassing political fallouts, but also as a way to continue pursuing narrow
financial and security interests under the cover of regional/international initiatives.
9 President Houphouet-Boigny, like Lissouba and Mobutu, was a strong ally of Jonas Savimbi, which in turn
led Luanda to support Gbagbo. Interview with UNITA’s former foreign minister, January 2012.10
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO: NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
The Congos are for Angola a matter of national security and regime survival; this was
the case in the 1990s and remains the case today. While eliminating support for rebel
movements is no longer a driving force given UNITA’s military defeat in 2002 and the
weakening and fracturing of the separatist Front of the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda (FLEC), Luanda fears the spill over of migrants, refugees, insurgents and
wildcat diamond miners into border areas that are antagonistic to the regime.
Angola has cemented its influence in the Congos through its robust and large-scale
military interventions in the 1990s. It was with Luanda’s support that Laurent Kabila
ousted Mobutu Sese-Seko in 1996. It was also with Luanda’s support that Denis
Sassou Nguesso took the presidency in the ROC after defeating Pascal Lissouba in
1997. In both cases, Angola’s military, technical, financial and troop support for the
insurrections secured their victories over long-standing incumbents. The driving
force at the time was to cut UNITA’s ability to use the Congos as rear bases, as logis-
tics channels, and alternative markets to sell their diamonds. In 1998 Angola
deployed 1,500 men in the DRC, together with Zimbabwean and Namibian troops. At
the time, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) troops went as far as the Kivus.10 This
second intervention was to secure Kabila’s survival, which pitted Luanda against
Uganda and Rwanda, a dynamic that is still relevant today. By 2001, Luanda was fully
committed to guaranteeing a more malleable and dependable presidency under
Joseph Kabila. Since then, Angola has been a key ally and pillar in maintaining Kabila
in power. This commitment is rapidly shifting.
Angola is thought to still have a strong military presence, with troops fully deployed
inside Congolese territory and using the means given by the government in
Kinshasa:11 ‘Since the 1998 military intervention we [Angolan troops] never left the
country’.12 These are not the same troops as the 500 FAA officers in training at the
Kitona base in the Bas-Congo province. While Angola has trained over 20,000 Congo-
lese soldiers and an estimated 15,000 police,13 it has also allegedly maintained the
deployment of the FAA brigade. Deployed with military intelligence capacity, they
are used to support the presidential guard in Kinshasa and to control the level of
internal dissidence within the Congolese governing alliance. Angolan military intelli-
gence (the Serviço de Inteligência e Segurança Militar or SISM) helps to collect infor-
mation and control emerging threats to Kinshasa. In 2006, Luanda helped Kabila
defeat fighters loyal to Jean-Pierre Bemba; in 2008, Angola was accused of deploying
10 Interview with retired FAA General involved in the DRC war, Luanda, 2012.
11 Interviews with various sources in the Angolan and South African military, 2015-16.
12 Correspondence with a military intelligence officer, 2016.
13 Angolan Foreign Minister George Chikoty’s speech to Chatham House, 20 February 2012.11
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYtroops against Laurent Nkunda.14 However, Luanda denies that it has any other
troops aside from those used for training. In December 2016, reports emerged that
Luanda was withdrawing its troops from the presidential barracks in Kinshasa in
protest at the violence and Kabila’s request for Rwanda’s assistance.15 A few months
earlier, Kabila had asked Luanda to increase the troop levels to stabilise the capital
with between 200 and 300 FAA special forces troops.16 Currently, Luanda’s strategy
is to position a battalion of FAA special forces in the northern province of Uige ready
to deploy if necessary;17 elsewhere, the brigades previously deployed in the neigh-
bouring municipalities are on full alert.
While Luanda’s interests in the DRC are not mainly driven by economic interests, the
offshore border disputes over oil concessions add another dimension to relations. In
2007, a Joint Angolan-Congolese commission agreed to share equally the production
of revenues from new oil wells in the Zone for Common Interest,18 but the deal has
not resolved the territorial dispute. The DRC’s access to the coast and its territorial
waters pass through the narrow strip between Angola and the Cabindan enclave,
while several of Angola’s oil blocks surround Congolese territorial waters.19 Tensions
between Dos Santos and Kabila reached a peak when the DRC called for international
arbitration of the offshore maritime dispute in May 2009. The complaint lodged with
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf brought under dispute
Block 15 – among others – one of Angola’s most profitable oil fields.20 The situation
escalated with the mutual expulsion of migrant workers.21 Angola estimates the
illegal mining of diamonds by Congolese prospectors has cost the country between
US$350 and US$700 million annually.22 Kinshasa claims that Angola has been stealing
thousands (potentially 100,000) of barrels a day of its oil. Angola requires Kinshasa’s
cooperation for two key infrastructure projects: the Angola-Cabinda road link
passing 150km through Congolese territory, and the Congo River Canyon Crossing
gas Pipeline linking Soyo to Cabinda. The pipeline facilitates liquefied natural gas
exports from the existing Soyo plant and the forthcoming Soyo refinery,23 both
projects representing billions of dollars of future revenue for the Angolan state.
14 ‘Angola disposta a aumentar a sua presence na Republica Democratica do Congo, 12 November 2008,
Publico.
15 Correspondence with Angolan and South African military officers, January – February 2017.
16 Correspondence with former military intelligence officer, 2016-17.
17 Confidential Report, December 2016.
18 Stearns, Jason, ‘Wikileaks: Angola – Congo Relations’, 14 February 2011, Congo Siasa.
19 Crisis Group Africa Report N188, Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?,
11 July 2012.
20 ‘Throwing out the neighbours’, Africa Confidential Vol 50(22) 6 November 2009.
21 Its is estimated that since 2004 over 400,000 Congolese migrant workers have been expelled from the
diamond fields. Stearns, Jason, ‘Wikileaks: Angola – Congo Relations’, 14 February 2011, Congo Siasa.
22 Crisis Group Africa Report N188, Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?,
11 July 2012.
23 The Soyo refiner is expected to process 110,000 barrels of oil a day and become operational in 2017, ‘Soyo
Refinery in Angola will process 110,000 barrels of oil per day’, 5 June 2015, MacauHub.12
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delicate political game to secure collaboration with Kinshasa and ensure that there
is harmonious coexistence:24 ‘With 2500km of common border the DRC is our biggest
security threat and we support Kabila because of interests’.25 If the border areas
become havens for roaming armed groups, given the difficult forested terrain and
access to resources, this could contribute to overstretching the army’s ability to
secure the border and the enclave of Cabinda. Luanda believes that if Kinshasa were
to erupt in a prolonged period of instability Angola could enter with a brigade and
restore order in the capital.26
Angola will not hesitate to act militarily in the DRC if its feels threatened, if it
perceives Rwanda’s aggression or if unrest in Kinshasa cannot be contained.
However, it will not deploy to save President Joseph Kabila, instead pushing for an
acceptable alternative to provide a policy of continuation. This policy may face
different challenges as the DRC’s political and security landscape is unravelling closer
to the Angolan border. Before the Kasai instability, Angola had a contingency plan27
to stabilise Kinshasa with the existing brigade and protect economic infrastructure
such as the bridge over the Congo river, the Matadi port, Inga Dam, the Katanga
mines and the areas bordering the Benguela railway. Since 2015, military exercises
to protect the Benguela railway line have been occurring in the Luau area of Moxico
province, which borders the DRC. This plan may now have changed because of the
increasing instability along the borders of the northern Angolan provinces. Military
sources reveal that there is fighting between Angolan forces and rebels of the
Kamwima Nsapu movement. The Lundas provinces – where the largest number of
refugees (estimated at 25,000) are entering from the conflict in the Kasai provinces
– are home to Angola’s largest diamond reserves and are a key part of the strategy
to appease Angolan generals through business dealings. The Lunda Chokwe, known
for their hostility to Luanda, resent the government’s heavy hand in diamond
dealings and their levels of poverty; their demands for federalism have also
remained unheeded. Local authorities are concerned that familial and ethnic links
between communities across the border will bring in more unregistered refugees,
adding to the volatility of the area. The concern is that the local alluvial diamonds
may be used by insurgents (as was the case with UNITA) to purchase arms and
increase their capacity to keep waging their rebellion. Further waves of refugees and
a greater focus on protecting the borders will add to the security concerns
surrounding levels of popular frustration following the disputed August 2017
elections.
24 Interview FAA General, Luanda, 2015
25 Interview retired FAA General, Luanda, 2012
26 Interview retired FAA General, Luanda, 2012
27 interview retired FAA General involved in the DRC intervention, Luanda, 201213
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYAlthough Luanda has framed its approach to Kinshasa more recently with the
rhetoric of multilateral cooperation, it is expected to be guided by national security
priorities. Efforts to support the National Episcopal Conference of Congo’s (CENCO)
mediation in 2016 allowed Luanda to show it was ready to become part of a
consensus-based solution to secure a peaceful transition. Yet frustration with
Kabila’s inability to contain the situation, and the recent announcement that
elections will only be held in 2018, will certainly push Luanda towards a more forceful
position. The recent public and unprecedented criticism by Dos Santos’ son-in-law
Sindika Dokolo of Kabila’s government and the handling of the Kasai crisis has been
interpreted as a position endorsed by Luanda. Dokolo is believed to be close to key
opposition figures including Olivier Kamitatu and Moise Katumbi. Luanda will not risk
instability in Kinshasa or the unpredictability of a new president whom it does not
control.
Relations with the ROC have faced different challenges. Angola’s intervention in
1997 in support of Denis Sassou Nguesso against President Pascal Lissouba was
aimed at denying UNITA access to rear bases but was also to ensure that political
loyalty in Brazzaville would close off Congo to any other rebel groups. Angola views
relations with Brazzaville from the viewpoint of Cabinda. Luanda’s security forces are
also reported to have maintained a presence in Brazzaville as guarantors of Sassou
Nguesso’s security,28 despite Luanda’s announcement that it was withdrawing 1,000
troops from Brazzaville in December 2002. This withdrawal coincided with the mass
deployments of troops into Cabinda to summarily end the FLEC insurgency. In 2006,
as Luanda was trying to secure a peace agreement with a FLEC faction, it was also
signing a cooperation agreement with Brazzaville to train Congolese special forces.
Despite the ‘political debt’ that Sassou Nguesso has towards Dos Santos, relations
have soured over the years. They have deteriorated over the resurgence of the FLEC
insurgency in 2016 and over regional issues, in particular the CAR, with Luanda
perceiving the situation as a ‘turf’ issue. The 2015 Nairobi-based negotiation led by
Sassou collided with Dos Santos’ agenda of pushing for President Catherine Samba
Panza to remain in power. Yet in 2016 the two capitals reached a new understanding
as Sassou Nguesso was preparing his third term bid, which led the Congolese presi-
dent to approach his Angolan counterpart to ensure that Luanda would not interfere
in the elections in exchange for a harder crackdown on FLEC and greater cooperation
on economic and regional issues. Cooperation in joint oil exploration projects was
expected to further cement relations between Brazzaville and Luanda. Both
countries agreed in mid-2015 to jointly exploit the Lianzi oilfield, creating the first
cross-border offshore energy development. The project is worth US$2 billion, and
estimates suggest that that there are 70 million barrels of oil to explore.29 However,
28 ‘Lessons from Luanda’, Africa Confidential Vol54:22, 31 October 2013
29 ‘Angola and Republic of Congo launch joint oil production’, 31st March 2015, MacauHub.14
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYthe recent increase in FLEC guerrilla and sabotage attacks in Cabinda have contrib-
uted to strained relations. Luanda has consistently been accused of staging raids into
Congo; it will continue to defend its right to pursue enemy forces, as seen with its
continued ‘rendition’ process of capturing or killing FLEC commanders in both
Congos.
Maintaining a strong presence in the two Congos will remain a priority for Luanda in
leveraging considerable political influence with the respective capitals. Determining
the political design of both Congos is a key aspect of its policy in the region, one that
is uniquely bilateral despite the veneer of multilateral cooperation. Luanda is already
thinking about the alternative leaders it could back to maintain primacy and influ-
ence over these two capitals and their political future as Sassou and Kabila are no
longer able to provide the necessary assurances of political stability.15
MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS: AU, REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND THE ICGLR
Bilateralism has dominated Angola’s international and regional engagements but a
growing appreciation of the utility of multilateral forums has developed in recent
years. The multilateral shift is aimed at enhancing the space to manoeuvre and
protect specific interests. As part of Angola’s objective to achieve diplomatic cover,
it is also an extension of the country’s ability to engage and steer diverse objectives.
By playing a role in such fora Angola also learns about the different dynamics and
policy positions of key countries: ‘Engaging with the AU and SADC is like an early
warning system; it helps us avoid taking measures that won’t work or know when the
situation is volatile and takes new contours’. Angola’s engagement with the AU has
only recently become a proactive relationship with an increased focus on navigating
the difficult terrain of African multilateralism. Engagement at the AU level has in the
past been perceived as neither effective nor internationally relevant.
The ruling elite perceives the AU summits as meetings of enemies and friends that
have double agendas and will not implement that to which they’ve agreed.30 This is
in line with Angola’s strategic use of multilateral forums, while it engages bilaterally
to achieve results. Although in the past Angola has chosen not to commit to certain
policy imperatives that could lead to internal contradictions, it did recognise the
newly independent Republic of South Sudan, despite the 50 years of war it sustained
in Cabinda with the secessionist FLEC movement. Luanda is showing that it may be
willing to conform to more mainstream AU positions and take shelter in the safety of
these political postures, while not making them a tenet of its own foreign policy.
Angola’s push for Mrs Dlamini Zuma’s election as chairperson of the AU Commission
was a joint effort with South Africa on the basis that SADC had never had an elected
AU head from its region. The support for Mrs Zuma’s election was aimed at removing
Jean Ping’s ‘European’ bias from the Commission but also at providing Luanda with
privileged access. The support for the nomination of Antonio Guterres as secretary
general of the UN reflects the same objective.
In its relations with regional organisations, Angola has sought to determine the rules
of engagement and deployed its petro-capitalist power to avoid placing itself in a
position of weakness politically, economically or militarily. This has been the case in
Luanda’s engagement with the SADC and the ECCAS. Since 2010, Luanda has actively
participated and contributed large troop contingents to the SADC and ECCAS
brigades, and taken part in joint training exercises. Projecting the power of its
military and ensuring its geostrategic position drives this military engagement.
Angola’s priority in the area of peace and security will always be defined as an
30 Interviews with diplomats and FAA Generals, Luanda, 2015.16
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYeconomic investment, although it does not define security within a broader develop-
ment agenda. Its peace and security engagement is aimed at creating the political
and regional space to pursue economic interests; several countries are used as
springboards into different regions and financial investments. Luanda perceives
SADC to be better organised than ECCAS, which initially led Angola to pay more
attention to the Southern African bloc as easier to engage. In this way, Angola has
wanted to keep the DRC under the direct influence of SADC and stay clear of the
problems of ECCAS by dealing with less difficult political navigations and contradic-
tory positions. In each region Angola has taken a renewed mediating role: in the
SADC region Luanda has prioritised engagement with the DRC and to a lesser extent
Burundi, and in the ECCAS region Luanda has joined forces with Chad and Congo with
the intention of stabilising the CAR.
Angola has been reluctant to join SADC’s Free Trade Agreement and has been slow
to respond to the regional integration process that established a customs union and
envisages a monetary union. Luanda could play a hugely important role in SADC’s
economic project given the economic complementarity with its neighbours. This,
however, would expose Luanda to the need to compromise with a development
agenda and a political architecture that would test the limits of its ‘democratic’ trans-
formation. So far, Angola has participated in large infrastructure projects in the
region including the Lobito transport corridor (linking Angola, the DRC and Zambia),
and the Trans-Cunene corridor (between Angola and Namibia). The transport
networks Angola is spearheading could potentially collide with South Africa’s
regional trade interests. Botswana, the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe have relied on
the port of Durban to export their minerals but could in the future begin using the
alternatives supplied by Angola.31 Once the Lobito deep water port and the 200,000
barrel a day refinery are completed, this would allow the link to the existing railway
system (the 1,300km Benguela railway) to facilitate exports from mineral rich
Katanga in the DRC and the copper belt in Zambia.32 In April 2012, a US$2.5 billion
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Lusaka and Luanda for
the construction of a 1,400km oil pipeline connecting Lobito to Lusaka.33 Luanda also
committed to supplying Zambia with refined petroleum products. This was expected
to come online in 2016, though the recent oil crisis may have delayed the construc-
tion.
Angola’s interest in ECCAS is twofold: it wants to take the hegemonic reins of the
organisation and to be a conduit between other interventions in the region. While it
31 Placido dos Santos, Gustavo, ‘Angola: Towards Supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa?’, Portugal Journal of
International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2014.
32 China has played a vital role in this transport link by investing $6 billion in the 600km railway from Katanga
to the border town of Dilolo and onto the Angolan Benguela railway. ‘Angola’s Chinese-built rail link and the
scramble to access the region’s resources’, 26 February 2014, Wits Journalism China-Africa Reporting
Project.
33 ‘Zambia and Angola sign $2.5 billion Oil Deal’, 16 April 2012, Lusaka Times.17
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYis active in ECCAS and has the stated objective of ‘becoming the boss of the region’,34
it is not party to the CEMAC monetary community which could leave Luanda outside
a strongly integrating force and thus prevented from becoming the hegemon of
Central Africa. Luanda believes it can play this leadership role on the basis that it has
the most developed economy of the region and has the strongest military capacity.
The establishment of the regional brigade and the Multinational Force of Central
Africa (Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale or FOMAC) has been hampered by
serious financial and logistics difficulties with a budget of US$18 million (compared
to SADC’s US$45 million and ECOWAS’ US$121 million).35 Despite this, the standby
brigade has the Angolan General Savihemba as its chief of staff. Angola understands
that the institutions in that region are heavily influenced by France.36 Efforts to
normalise relations with France since the Angolagate fallout have been slow and
further strained by competing agendas in the CAR, although more aligned on
Burundi. Other countries in the region understand that for Angola to maximise its
role it will need to bridge the divide that persists with Paris.37
Luanda recently made a large payment to ECCAS covering the last four years in
arrears, signalling a renewed commitment to operate under the organisation. This
comes as Luanda has taken an active role in the CAR mediation effort that has transi-
tioned from its usual bilateral nature to a joint approach under the AU involving
ECCAS, Chad and Congo. Angola’s initial engagement with CAR fell within its tradi-
tional pursuit of preferential relations with the then CAR Interim President Catherine
Samba Panza. In 2014, Luanda signed a US$10 million MoU in humanitarian aid and
support to the political authorities38 as it was considering sending in a police contin-
gent and military company as part of a bilateral SSR arrangement. Angola revealed
its intention to contribute troops to the UN Mission MINUSCA in 2015 but the
process stalled at the UN level because of alleged political undercutting by western
powers.39 This blockage was perceived as having been driven by the French in an
attempt to keep Angola outside the region. The perception in Luanda was that obsta-
cles were placed in front of this deployment, beginning with the ECCAS intervention
during Bozize’s presidency. The lack of foresight by New York to facilitate Angola’s
contribution to a peacekeeping mission was a mistake that may dissuade Luanda
from considering future deployments.
Given its military and strategic airlift capacities, Angola could be an important
contributor to peace and security operations in Africa. Its fleet of Russian IL-76
34 Interview with key presidential advisor, Luanda, 2015.
35 Meyer, Angela, ‘Peace and Security Cooperation in Central Africa’, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Upsalla, 2011,
p. 17 and 27.
36 Drivers of Change Angola, Position Paper 3: International Relations, Regional Security and Development,
January 2008, Dfid.
37 Correspondence with senior ECCAS official, April 2017.
38 ‘Angola, CAR sign legal instruments for bilateral cooperation’, 5 March 2014, Angop.
39 Interviews with diplomats, Paris and Geneva, 2016.18
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYaircraft and its combat experience of rapidly deploying troops and hardware into
different war zones remains a vital selling point. However, when future deployments
occur, more care will need to be taken to understand Angola’s concerns in peace-
keeping. One issue that arose during MINUSCA’s brief foray was the issue of mandate
and the command of forces. Negotiating the mandate became a problem as the
military chiefs in Luanda did not think the mandate reflected the situation on the
ground. The UN apparently wanted two battalions sent to the north of the CAR but
with a peace mandate rather than the ability to use force as understood by the
Angolans. Logistical incapacity and limitations in several areas were also raised as
Angola wanted to be coordinated with the UN but not under the UN.
Luanda’s current efforts in the CAR are steering towards bringing the remaining two
large armed groups (Seleka and Bozize-aligned Anti-Balaka) into the peace agree-
ment and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. The talks
are being mediated by General Andre Oliveira Sango, head of Angola’s External Intel-
ligence service, with several discreet meetings in Luanda and Benguela in December
2016. One area of concern that will collide with Angola’s approach of general
amnesty for all groups is the demand for justice and the UN push to establish a
criminal court for the CAR. Angola is using its own experience, which will fall short of
acceptable transitional standards of peace, reconciliation, accountability and
democratic reform. As with previous engagements, Angola’s diplomatic efforts bring
economic attachments. Reports in 2015 pointed to negotiations involving Isabel Dos
Santos, who controls Angola’s diamond industry and now heads Sonangol, in setting
up a state diamond-marketing company.40 Having allegedly pledged US$11 million to
such efforts, as well as having lobbied the Kimberly Process to establish a ‘green
zone’ for diamond mining when Angola held its chair in 2015, Luanda will still face
serious resistance from France about venturing into the diamond sector in CAR.
In January 2014 Luanda took on the presidency of the ICGLR and has been credited
with having an impressive convening power by hosting large-scale summits in
Luanda. Angola has used its power in the ICGLR, where the country is now in its third
year as chair, to strengthen its role in the region with the AU and the UN. It strategi-
cally began to engage with regional ‘enemies’ in appeasing tensions and guaran-
teeing stability in its neighbours; it began engaging Rwanda in May 2014 and signed
a cooperation framework to defuse tensions and improve relations with Kigali.
Uganda and Angola signed several agreements strengthening bilateral cooperation.
However, relations with Kigali have since soured following the Burundi crisis. Angola
is thought to have supplied President Nkurunziza both with diplomatic cover
blocking any peacekeeping force, and potentially with financial support and
weapons,41 though none of this is confirmed. As a result, Angola seems to take
40 ‘Diamonds’ Best Friend’, Africa Confidential Vol 56(6) 20 March 2015.
41 Correspondence with retired Burundian diplomat, 2016.19
ANGOLA’S AFRICA POLICYcontradictory positions in central Africa, pushing for change in some capitals, while
assisting the incumbent in others. Future and sustained engagements in multilateral
forums may assist in aligning strategies that complement political shifts across the
region, while allowing Luanda to retain the necessary bilateral link to enhance its
options and influence. Angola’s adherence to the principles and values pillaring these
multilateral arrangements should be encouraged so that it plays a constructive role
and circumvents its realpolitik tendencies, in particular as it takes on greater media-
tion and stabilisation roles.20
CONCLUSION
Luanda will continue to exert and seek to extend its influence throughout Africa with
the aim of furthering its economic and security interests. Its growing multilateral
engagement reflects a concerted effort to become a leading continental power broker,
although it will face several challenges to its mediation and securitisation efforts in
several regions. Its previously financially dominated foreign policy simplified issues
through the lens of transactional politics. However, not all problems can be resolved
financially and through client relationships. Opaque bilateral security and economic
arrangements, including Angola’s propensity for president-to-president economic
deals, may be further challenged by new leaders and regional integration projects in
particular. As it ventures into political conflict and peace and security issues, Angola
will face the many shortcomings of its own war-to-peace transition as it attempts to
export its lessons, failing to understand the much-needed nuances of power-sharing,
peace missions and democratic transitions. The government’s desire for greater inter-
national recognition and relevance may also open new avenues for Western partners
to influence its policies in ways that serve mutual interests. However, if Angola decides
to embark on the adage of ‘when failing domestically to pursue an aggressive foreign
policy’, this may introduce a different dynamic for the Congos and relations with key
partners. A shift might also be expected if the new President Joao Lourenco begins
redefining Angola’s priorities in ways that shift from those defined under Dos Santos.
The unprecedented agreement achieved with Washington in April 2017 for military
cooperation may be an indication of this potential shift.
The transition Angola in undergoing should not be underestimated. The four-decade
reign of Dos Santos is ended as the country faces a financial and political elite crisis.
Stronger opposition parties and expectations for reform will further place pressure
on the new president, who will have to carefully navigate a difficult MPLA setting, a
potentially divided security apparatus, and governance through redundant and
disempowered state institutions. Opposition parties, led by UNITA, jointly claimed
that the ruling MPLA stile the August 2017 elections bringing to the fore a serious
crisis of legitimacy for Lourenço42. As the architect of Angola’s foreign policy Presi-
dent Dos Santos revealed a unique astuteness and pragmatism to balance different
interests. His successor Lourenco is now facing internal challenges and may not have
the luxury of time and financial liquidity to redefine Angola’s foreign policy. Efforts
should remain focused on bringing Angola into a multilateral setting that will allow it
to play a constructive role in central Africa and beyond as a contributor to UN and AU
peacekeeping missions. While Luanda’s experience in the past may have revealed
some difficulties, it still retains the potential to alter key dynamics in political crises
due to historical, political and financial relations.
42 ISS Today: Angola’s Elections trigger crisis of Legitimacy, 8 September 2017, Institute for Security Studies21
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